v148 · origin trial · experimental

Connection Allowlists

A site-controlled allowlist of outbound endpoints. Once configured, requests initiated from the document (or any worker it spawns) can only reach the endpoints the site has authorised — even if a script tries to send data elsewhere.

Heads up Origin trial. API surface is moving — read the WICG explainer for the canonical shape.

concepts

  1. Policy Inspector

    Visualise a sample allowlist policy and walk through outbound requests, classifying each as allowed or blocked. Useful for designing your own list before deploying it.

  2. Endpoint Tester

    Build a policy, paste candidate URLs, then run the actual fetches. Classifies first against your allowlist, then issues the live request — so you can A/B-test a candidate policy against real third-party SDK endpoints before deploying.

  3. Allowlist Violation Demo

    Simulate how the allowlist blocks exfiltration attempts. Fire allowlisted requests (pass) and off-list tracker/exfil URLs (blocked) side-by-side, with a live event log showing which requests get a NetworkError and which go through.

  4. Allowlist Policy Builder

    A visual configuration tool for Chrome enterprise allowlist policies. Add domains, select policy type (InsecureContentAllowedForUrls, JavaScriptAllowedForUrls, PopupsAllowedForUrls), and get JSON output in both raw and Chrome Admin Console format. A URL tester simulates which requests would be allowed or blocked under the active policy.

  5. Worker Propagation Demo

    Edit the allowed-endpoint list, then fire document-side and worker-side requests in parallel. Both contexts are evaluated against the same propagated policy — the worker cannot expand or bypass the policy inherited from its spawning document. Each request is classified PASS or BLOCKED with a live event log.

why it exists

Developers want explicit control over the endpoints a page can reach. That control is what stops a malicious third-party script from leaking user data to an unfamiliar server, and it lets a site enforce its own data-flow policies independently of CSP. The proposal distributes an authorised endpoint list from the document to every worker it spawns; a request to anything off-list is rejected before it leaves the user agent.

references

implementation reference

Need the exact API surface, compatibility boundaries, errors, lifecycle, and source links? Read the matching gendn reference ↗